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TUGS, STEVEDORES, AND THE WARRANTY OF
WORKMANLIKE PERFORMANCE
DAVID G. DAVIESt

"And they had a knack of dying interesting deaths and uttering
memorable last words."'
The law of admiralty has developed more than its share of memorable words. Part of this results from status as a restricted specialty; for
with a specialized bar, a knowledgable body of litigants, large amounts
of money often at stake, concentration in a limited number of courts, and
the special patronage of the United States Supreme Court, admiralty has
proven to be a laboratory for judicial experimentation and innovation.
Furthermore, admiralty cases present dramatic fact situations. It is a
rare case that does not bring out just a little of the Joseph Conrad in the
attorney writing the brief or the judge writing his opinion.
Occasionally, these words develop a momentum of their own that
outstrips the ideas that underlie them. This paper will be a study of a
particular subspecialty of admiralty law-the liability relationship between
a tug and its tow-in which momentum of the words "ex delicto" and
that of "warranty of workmanlike performance" have recently led in two
opposite directions. In one case the progression has been toward what is
for admiralty a very conventional three-possibility tort-collision division
of damages, and in the other, toward a more radical and artificial twopossibility contractual standard of indemnification for damage.
Perhaps the root of the divergence lies in the fact that a tug-tow
accident has elements of both contract and tort. The tug and tow owners
begin with an implied or actual contractual relationship, while the tug
tMember of the Ohio and Michigan Bars, associated with the firm of Arter, Hadden, Van Duzer, and Wycoff, Cleveland, Ohio; Visiting Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law, (summer 1968). The opinions expressed in this article are not
necessarily those of the author's firm or its clients.
1. P. BLOOMFmLD, UNcommON PEOPLE 31 (1955), concerning the descendants of
one Sir Henry Sidney, "[m]any of [whom] lived cultivated and full lives, even when
these were somewhat abruptly brought to an end," but who, the writer admits, were to
his knowledge otherwise unconnected with the towing business.
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and the tow themselves are in a physical relationship that presents ample
opportunity for the type of inadvertent physical damage that is the
essence of tort. Any damage that results generally is, as with most maritime torts, the subject of insurance.2
For many years, words and ideas common to tort have dominated
the liability of tug to tow, and the leading case has been Stevens v. The
White City,' decided in 1932 in which the Supreme Court, in exonerating
the tug from liability for the tow's hull damage, held:
It has long been settled that suit by the owner of a tow
against her tug to recover for an injury to the tow caused by
negligence on the part of the tug is a suit ex delicto and not ex
contractu.

...

[The tug owner] .

.

. owed to the [tow] owner such care

and maritime skill as prudent navigators employ for the performance of similar service.
In recent years, however, it appears that the word "warranty" has
gained currency in situations where the tow is seeking indemnity. The
leading case for this approach has been the Second Circuit's 1957 decision
2. The tug's key insurance coverage is the Collision Clause with Tower's Liability
of the hull insurance policy:
And it is further agreed that if the Vessel hereby insured shall come into
collision with any other Vessel, craft or structure, floating or otherwise
(including her tow) ; or shall strand her tow or shall cause her tow to come
into collision with any other vessel, craft, or structure, floating or otherwise
or shall cause any other loss or damage to her tow or to the freight thereof
or to the property on board, and the Assured, as owner of the Vessel in consequence thereof, or the surety for said Assured in consequence of his undertaking, shall become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages to any
other person or persons any sum or sums not exceeding in respect of any
one such casualty the value of the Vessel hereby insured, we, the Underwriters,
will pay the Assured such proportion of such sum or sums so paid as our subscriptions hereto bear to the value of the Vessel hereby insured....
Note that coverage of liability to the tow is broader than the pure "collision" coverage
with respect to other vessels or structures, but that Tower's Liability coverage does not
include injuries to persons on board the tow or the amount by which any claim exceeds
the value of the tug. This coverage therefore interlocks with "Protection and Indemnity"
(P & I) coverage and excess insurance. See Hecht, The Hull Policy: Interrelationship
of Hull & P & I, 41 TUL. L. REv. 389 (1967). For a general discussion of maritime
insurance, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, TIIE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 48-86 (1957) (hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK).
3. 285 U.S. 195, 201 (1932). A corollary is that a lien for towing damage may take

tort priority in the uncertain hierarchy of maritime liens, The John G. Stevens, 170
U.S. 113 (1898), heavily relied upon in The White City case; but see GILMORE &
BLACK 598: "[N]egligent towing claims do not seem to be as firmly anchored on the
tort side as ordinary collision and personal injury claims." A second corollary has been
that the tug generally cannot contract away liability for negligence. Bisso v. Inland
Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
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in McWilliams Blue Line v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,' where the impleaded
tug owner lost to the tow's charterer on facts that will be discussed in
greater detail below,5 and the court said:
...The towing agreement between the respondent and respondent-impleaded necessarily implied an obligation on the part of
the respondent-impleaded to tow libelant's barge properly and
safely. Competency and safety were essential elements of the
towing service undertaken by the respondent-impleaded. The
very nature of this towing agreement implied a 'warranty of
workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufacturer's
warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product.' Ryan
v. Pan-Atlantic Corp., 350 U.S. at pages 133-134.
The words "warranty of workmanlike service" have, since having
been brought to admiralty in Ryan just sixteen months before McWilliams
Blue Line, proven both memorable and potent. They refer to a body of
law that has since undergone dramatic development. In turn, McWilliams
Blue Line has been followed either explicitly or in principle in some five
cases' without having yet had so dramatic an effect. However, in many
more tug-tow cases, the tort-collision doctrine of Stevens has remained
the governing principle.'
Though on the surface not radically different, the pigeonholes labeled
"tort" and "warranty" have the capacity for producing unpredictable and
diametrically opposite results when a situation arises on a tow that has
not yet occurred in a reported case: when the faults or unseaworthiness
of both tug and tow have contributed to a casualty involving damage or
injury to the tug, the tow, and a third party.
I.

WHAT RYAN IMPLIES:

A

SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

WARRANTY PRINCIPLE IN HARBOR WORKER LITIGATION

To understand the implications of the citation of Ryan in McWilliams
4. 245 F.2d 84, 87, 1957 A.M.C. 1213, 1217 (2d Cir. 1957).
5. See text at notes 48 & 49 infra.
6. United States v. Tug Manzanillo, 310 F.2d 220, 1963 A.M.C. 365 (9th Cir.
1962); Dunbar v. Henry DuBois' Sons Inc., 275 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 815 (1960); Singer v. Dorr, 272 F. Supp. 931, 1968 A.M.C. 146 (E.D. La.
1967); Tebbs v. Baker-Whitely Towing Co., 271 F. Supp. 529, 1968 A.M.C. 668 (D.
Md. 1967); Farrell v. S.S. Birkenstein, 207 F. Supp. 500, 1963 A.M.C. 1846 (S.D.N.Y.

1962) (semble).
7. See, e.g., Chitty v. The Valley Voyager, 284 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. La. 1968);
Tidewater Constr. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 269 F. Supp. 1000, 1004, 1967 A.M.C.
1908 (ED. Va. 1967) ; Offshore Co. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co., 262 F. Supp. 282,
286, 1966 A.M.C. 2172 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Derby Co. v. A.L. Mechling Barge Lines,
Inc., 258 F. Supp. 206, 211 (E.D. La. 1966) ; South Inc. v. Moran Towing & Transp.
Co. 252 F. Supp. 500, 505, 1965 A.M.C. 2559 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd 360 F.2d 1002,
1966 A.M.C. 1987 (2d Cir. 1966); Frederick Snare Corp. v. Moran Towing & Transp.
Co. 195 F. Supp. 639, 641, 1961 A.M.C. 2605 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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Blue Line, one must review the development of law dealing with the thirdparty liability of the tug's maritime neighbor, the stevedore. Development
of this principle, in turn, has been as a corollary to that of first-party
liability based upon the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness. Both
developments are the subjects of a considerable literature.8 Very briefly,
the law has developed as follows:
First-partyliability to seaman. The absolute duty of the shipowner
to furnish a seaworthy vessel to his own crew has been developing since
1944, when the Supreme Court decided Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,'
and its momentum has carried the doctrine to what is probably its full
vertical"0 development. Liability is not dependent on traditional standards
of negligence. To constitute unseaworthiness, a condition need not have
existed for any substantial period of time,1 ' nor, apparently, need it be
discernible to ordinary inspection.' 2 On the other hand, while negligence
is not an element of unseaworthiness, it is now doubtful that negligence
can exist independently of unseaworthiness; the safest course is for a
trial judge to instruct in both.1
8. E.g., Ambler, Seamen Are "Wards of the Admiralty" But Longshoremen Are
Now More Privileged, 29 WASH. L. REv. 243 (1954) ; Baer, Down to the Seas Again,
40 N.C.L. REv. 377 (1962); Benbow, Seaworthiness and Seamen, 9 MIAMI L.Q. 418
(1955) ; Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
CORNELL L. Q. 381 (1954) and Wright, Justice at the Dock; The Maritime Worker and
Mr. Justice Black, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 524 (1967). See generally, M. NORRIS, LAW OF
MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES AFFECTING HARBOR WORKERS, PASSENGERS

AND VISITORS

(2d ed., 1966). See also Weinstock, note 23 infra.
9. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
10. "Vertical" is used here as in Benbow, saipra note 8, at 424, to describe the
growth of a doctrine within a particular class of workers, and "horizontal," its spread
to similar occupations and industries.
11. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). Mitchell also contains
the language which gives solace to the otherwise frustrated defendant-shipowner (or
the third-party defendant who may have to indemnify him) in the charge to the jury:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish
an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is
not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every
conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel
reasonably suitable for her intended service.
362 U.S. at 550.
12. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), reh. denied, 347 U.S. 994
(1954).
13. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967). See also
Jackson, J., dissenting in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406-20 (1953):
"The
court's
instructions
scrambled
common-law
negligence doctrines with
admiralty principles of indemnity for unseaworthiness." "Operational negligence" was
once thought to be something different from unseaworthiness, so that a harbor worker
injured as the immediate result of his fellow employee's negligent operation of seaworthy
equipment might fail against the shipowner as a matter of law. For discussions of the
intricacies of this doctrine, see Friendly, J., dissenting in Skibinsky v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 360 F.2d 539, 1966 A.M.C. 873 (2d Cir. 1966); Kaufman, J., dissenting in
Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966) ; and Note, 76 HARV. L. REv.
819, 827-28 (1963). The Court's decision in Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237
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The development of the doctrine of unseaworthiness is analogous to
that of product liability "in tort" :14 The doctrine has largely eclipsed
what was once the seaman's primary recovery based on negligence under
the Jones Act,' 5 just as product liability "in tort" apparently is eclipsing
its forerunner doctrine of sales warranties, even though the latter has
been expanded under Uniform Commercial Code. 6 However, the trend
in selection of words in maritime personal injuries has been from tort to
contract, while that in product liability has been from contract to tort.
As in the case of product liability, the trend has been to widen the
circle of those entitled to the shipowner's warranty. This horizontal" development began soon after Mahnich in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,5 holding a longshoreman to be entitled to the same warranty as a seaman so
long as he does the work of a seaman. 9 From that point, the doctrine has
spread horizontally to benefit employees of other specialized maritime industries who are said to have supplanted the seaman in his work." This
spread provided the first element of the situation that was to lead to the
development of the Ryan indemnity doctrine cited in McWilliams Blue
Line.
On the other hand, the analogy to product liability is not entirely
accurate, for while the typical product liability case generally arises from
the malfunctioning of a defective object in the hands of the accident
(1967), rev'g 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966), at least severely damaged this doctrine, but see
Bryan, J., dissenting in Venable v. A.S. Det Fornede Dampskibsselskab, 387 F.2d
639, 1968 A.M.C. 1437 (4th Cir. 1968).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402 (A) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1965).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). "The true measure of the success of the Jones Act
is that it has become obsolete." GaMoaz & BLACK 315.
16. See Shanker, Strict Tort Failure Product Liability and The Uniform Cominercial Code, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 5 (1965).
17. See Benbow, supra note 8, at 424.
18. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
19. Technical innovation seems to be the secret for shipowner's non-liability. A
shoreside electrician, since he does not do the work of a seaman, is not entitled to the
warranty. Halecki v. United New York and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 358
U.S. 613 (1959). This does not mean that he cannot recover on some other theory. Id.
302 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 825 (1962). Likewise, the duties of
a marine tally clerk in a container loading operation are not "the type of work
traditionally done by seamen," and the warranty does not apply. Gibbard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 284 F. Supp. 634, 1968 A.M.C. 1046(C.D. Calif. 1968).On the other hand,
the historical theory that even the longshoreman supplanted the seaman rests on thin
historical surmise. "Man may have evolved from the coelacanth, but through all recorded
history, the longshoreman has been a land creature." Tetreault, supra note 8, at 414. An
extreme alternative is to lay up the ship, which cuts off the warranty. Roper v. United
States, 368 U.S. 20 (1961).
20. See, e.g., Mortensen v. A/S Glittre, 348 F.2d 383, 1965 A.M.C. 2016 (2d Cir.
1965) (marine painter); Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310, (2d Cir.
1958) (engine repairman); Smith v. Brown & Root Marine Operations Inc., 243 F.
Supp. 130, 1965 A.M.C. 2368 (W.D. La. 1965), af'd 376 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1967)
(marine diver). All of these cases also involve third-party recovery by shipowner
against contractor-employer.
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victim or another consumer, the complex fabric of shipboard operation
provides many opportunities for simultaneous interaction between negligent operation and defective condition to produce injury or accident. 2
Instead of a simple and serial chain from manufacturers through sellers
to users, many potential shipboard accidents involve a complex and simultaneous parallel interaction of independent elements, some involving
people, others things. This complexity presents the second element of the
backdrop against which Ryan was developed.
Third-party stevedore-shipowner indemnity. Liability without fault,
hoiizontal development of duty to alias seamen, and complex interaction
of causes to produce accidents had in themselves the potential to create a
terribly complicated lawsuit. In the case of a longshoreman or harbor
worker, there was an additional element that seemed an extremely unfair
shifting of liability-the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Act,22
a workmen's compensation statute that prevented the injured man from
suing his own employer even though the employer often might be the
only active participant in the accident. As a result, to obtain an openended jury award the injured longshoreman could and would sue only
the shipowner under the warranty that was opened to him by the horizontal development of the unseaworthiness doctrine.
Shipowners thus found themselves vulnerable "target" defendants
in spite of the fact that the unseaworthiness of their ships often played
a very small and passive part in the occurrence of accidents and often
involved little or no fault on their part. As a result, they in turn attempted
third-party recoveries under various theories against the employers of
injured alias seamen.2 At this point the choice of words again proved
to be the key in the development of doctrine.
The first choice favored the contractor. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,24 there was a disparity of fault between
ship and stevedore.
Halcyon Lines hired the Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting
Corporation to make repairs on Halcyon's ship

.

. ..

[A]n

employee of Haenn was injured aboard the ship while engaged
in making these repairs . .
damages against Halcyon .

.
. .

. [H]e brought this action for
. On the ground that Haenn's

21. Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). The exception does not apply to bar the shipowner
liability of the stevedore-employer where he is both stevedore and shipowner. Reed v.
The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
23. Cases are collected in Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Ship9wners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L. REv., 321, 323-27
(1954).
24. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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negligence had contributed to the injuries, Halcyon brought
Haenn in as a third-party defendant. . . .[T]he district judge
allowed the introduction of evidence tending to show the relative degree of fault of the two parties. On this evidence, the
jury returned a special verdict finding Haenn 75 per cent and
Halcyon 25 per cent responsible.2"
The trial court divided damages,26 but the court of appeals modified
the judgment, limiting the contractor's share to its potential liability
under the Longshoremen's Act." Both sides appealed to the Supreme
Court, which reversed, entirely denying contribution from the contractor
to the shipowner. In an opinion by Justice Black, Justices Reed and
Burton dissenting, the Court said:
Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is
established admiralty doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers
shall share equally the damages sustained by each, as well as
personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent third
parties. This maritime rule is of ancient origin and has been
applied in many cases, but this Court has never expressly applied
it to non-collision cases. Halcyon now urges us to extend it to
non-collision cases and to allow contribution here based upon
the relative degree of fault of Halcyon and Haenn as found by
the jury. Haenn urges us to hold that there is not right of contribution, or in the alternative, that the right be based upon equal
division of all damages. ... "
The accuracy of the generalization about non-collision cases is
immediately open to question: The Court had applied the rule to cases
other than collisions. 2 The Court, however, refused to extend the rule
beyond collisions:
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a commonlaw jurisdiction have generally held that they cannot on their
own initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as be25. 342 U.S. at 283.
26. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 89 F. Supp. 756, 1950 A.M.C. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
27. 187 F.2d 403, 1951 A.M.C. 542 (3d Cir. 1951).
28. 342 U.S. at 284.
29. See generally, Tetreault, supra note 8, at 421-22. Relevant to the present
question, lower courts for years unhesitatingly applied the division role to non-collision
cases between tow and tug. E.g., Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaragueuse, S.A., 364
F.2d 118, 1966 A.M.C. 2392 (2d Cir. 1966) (capsizing of tug "tripped" against channel
bank by tow-though the pilot it furnished was the only tug employee at fault) ; Allied
Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Tug Christine Moran, 303 F.2d 197, 1962 A.M.C. 1198 (2d Cir.
1962) (stranding of tow) ; Chitty v. M/V Valley Voyager, 284 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. La.
1968) (capsizing tow) ; see note 61 infra.
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tween joint tortfeasors ....

To some extent courts exercising

jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than commonlaw courts in fashioning rules, and we would feel free to do so
here if wholly convinced that it would best serve the ends of
justice.
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to
fashion new judicial rules of contribution and that the solution
of this problem should await congressional action . ... 0
The next and succeeding rounds of word choosing went clearly in
favor to the shipowners and added the words "warranty of workmanlike
service" to the admiralty lawyer's phrase book. In Ryan Stevedoring
Co., Inc., v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,"' there again was mixed but lopsided fault. Although there was no finding of degree of fault, the same
stevedore (Pan-Atlantic) had loaded and was unloading the ship when
cargo rolled out of stow and struck the plaintiff; the reports indicate no
fault on the part of the ship's crew other than failure of the ship's officer
responsible for stowage to correct an apparently dangerous condition
created by the stevedore at the time of loading.32 After a plaintiff's
verdict against the shipowner in the first-party portion of the lawsuit,
the trial court, trying the third-party issues without a jury, found that
the plaintiff had recovered partly because of the shipowner's own negligence and not just because of unseaworthiness. As to liability for negligence, the non-contribution holding of Halcyon governed and the court
denied indemnity." The Court of Appeals reversed, still treating the
shipowner as alternatively liable for negligence and unseaworthiness, but
nevertheless entitled to indemnity in either event: If he were negligent,
the stevedore's negligence was still active and primary;4 if, on the other
30. 342 U.S. at 284.
31. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
32. Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 505, 1953 A.M.C. 755,
(E.D.N.Y. 1953), but note that for the four dissenters of the Supreme Court, this would
have been enough. 350 U.S. at 138-39.
33. The testimony of the longshoremen as to the generally dangerous manner
in which the cargo was stowed ... leads to no other conclusion but that the
cargo officer in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered and
corrected the condition ....

Consequently .

.

. Pan-Atlantic .

.

. was . . . a

joint tort-feasor, and under such circumstances, a contract of indemnity cannot
be implied on the part of Ryan.
111 F. Supp. at 507.
34. "[I]ndemnity over is recoverable where, as here, the employer's negligence
was the 'sole' 'active' or 'primary' cause of the accident." 211 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir.
1954). The verbal distinction between "active" and "passive" negligence has never been
a critical favorite; see Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed
Rationale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517, 539-43 (1952) ; and Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Johit Tortleasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 154 (1932). For the ultimate demise
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hand, he were liable because he had without fault provided an unseaworthy
ship, he was entitled to contractual indemnity.
The Supreme Court majority was even less concerned with the
ship's negligence. The Court first affirmed by an evenly divided court,3"
then affirmed 5-4 with an opinion." Justice Black, who wrote for the
majority in Halcyon, dissented. Justice Burton, who had dissented in
Halcyon, wrote for the majority, saying that the key to the dispute lay
in a "warranty," and this foreclosed more elaborate examination of tortbased indemnity:
The shipowner here holds petitioner's uncontroverted
agreement to perform all of the shipowner's stevedoring operations at the time and place where the cargo in question was
loaded.... Competency and safety of stowage are inescapable
elements of the service undertaken. This obligation is not a
quasi-contractual obligation implied in law or arising out of a
non-contractual relationship. It is the essence of petitioner's
stevedoring contract. It is petitioner's warranty of workmanlike
service that is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the
soundness of its manufactured product."
After Ryan, the vertical development of the "warranty of workmanlike service" proceeded rapidly. It became apparent that if the shipowner's
duty was absolute, that of the stevedore was more so. Soon after Ryan,
the court held that the warranty provided full indemnity when the
negligence of the stevedore "brought into play" an unseaworthy condition
on the ship;3" then it held the warranty to apply where the stevedore
brought on board a latently defective piece of equipment. 9 Harbor
worker-shipowner-marine contractor litigation has become a major business at the trial court level in jurisdictions having major ports.4" While
of the active/passive distinction, see Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating

Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
33. a49 U.S. 901 (1955).
36. 350 U.S. 125 (1956).
37. 350 U.S. at 133-34.
38. Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
39. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazone v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376
U.S. 315 (1964).
40. For example, Chief Judge Clary of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
testified:
[W]hile in 1961 the longshoremen cases constituted only 8 per cent of the
total tort actions, . . . they constituted more than 23 per cent of the total
tort actions in June of 1966 . . . . We then compared and charted the proportionate increase of maritime cases (longshoreman and Jones Act) with the
termination rate of maritime cases. The termination rate was shockingly low.
We found that there were no more longshoremen jury cases tried in 1966 than
there were in 1961, and that during some intervening years, there had been less
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it is not safe to say that the doctrine has reached its full vertical development within the immediate field of harbor workers, the cases involving
most common on-board marine contractors have reached a point where
there is a reasonable degree of predictability of outcome.4
The principal remaining area of stress is the effect of the shipowner's
own fault on his ability to recover indemnity. In 1958, in Weyerhaeuser
Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.,42 the Court had another mixed
fault case like Halcyon in which "the jury found [the shipowner] 'guilty
of some act of negligence' " in leaving a jerry-built winch shelter in
place. The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the stevedore on the
indemnity issue and a divided court of appeals affirmed. In reversing
and remanding for trial, a unanimous Court left this dictum:
We believe that respondent's contractual obligation to perform its duties with reasonable safety related not only to the
handling of cargo, as in Ryan, but also to the use of equipment
incidental thereto, such as the winch shelter involved here....
If in that regard respondent rendered a substandard performance
which led to foreseeable liability of petitioner, the latter was
entitled to indemnity absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude recovery."
Since Weyerhaeuser, there has been constant probing by the employers of harbor workers to find just what conduct will preclude recovery.
So far, the reported cases have shown primarily what will not, and the
most widely-cited formula is that of Albanese v. N. V. Nederl. Anerik.
Stoomv. Maats., which allows indemnity to the shipowner unless his fault
is of a degree to "prevent or seriously handicap the stevedore in his ability
to do a workmanlike job. Merely concurrent fault is not enough.""
longshoremen and Jones Act cases tried than had been tried in 1961. Yet, during
the same five-year period, there had been a 340 per cent build-up in the pending
longshoremen cases....
Testimony 'before a subcommittee on improvement and judicial machinery of the
committee on the judiciary, United States Senate, CRIsIs IN THE FEDERAL COURTS1967 at 46, as quoted by the court in Turner v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana,
1968 A.M.C. 1096, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
41. The author summarizes remaining "problem areas" in Proudfoot, 'The Tar
Baby': Maritime Personal-InjuryIndemnity Actions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 423, 43445 (1968).
An area of further inquiry that still causes some anXiety to shipowners is the possible
effect of contractual disclaimers of the warranty of workmanlike service; compare
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-316.

42. 355 U.S. 563, 567-68 (1958) (emphasis added).
43. 355 U.S. 563, 567.
44. 346 F.2d 481, 484, 1965 A.M.C. 1201 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 382
U.S. 283 (1965), reaffirmed on this point, 392 F.2d 763, 1968 A.M.C. 800 (2d
Cir. 1968), rev'd sub norn. International Terminal Operating Co. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik.
Stoomv. Maats., 393 U.S. 74 (1968). A court followed the first court of appeals case in
a towing case in Tebbs v. Baker-Whiteley Towing Co., 271 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1967).
In each instance the court of appeals held the stevedore liable to indemnify the ship-
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It is the horizontal spread of the Ryan indemnity doctrine beyond
the coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act that is
relevant to the present subject. In the tug-tow relationship there is no
longer a potential injustice like that of Halcyon and Ryan, for there is
no umbrella protecting the tug owner from direct liability to his employee
without regard to his own active fault." Therefore, the imbalance against
the shipowner only technically at fault that existed between Mahnich and
Ryan could never exist. Furthermore, the towing industry provides a
setting for substantial property and hull damage actions-in which
compensation bars to direct litigation never have been a factor at all.
When one's attention shifts from harbor workers to tug and towing, the
problems that arise from a warranty or superwarranty standard call for
more consideration than the recital of appropriate words as soon as it
appears that there is a marine contract.
II. THE

IMPORTATION OF RYAN TO TOWING CASES

McWilliams Blue Line and the Overkilled Laches Defense. Ryan
first appeared in a towing case in McWilliams Blue Line z'. Esso Standard
Oil Co."0 This was a three-party action for damage to a barge that began
between owner and charterer one day before the expiration of the local
tort statute of limitations. As years before in Mahnich4 7 this last fact
was to prove a catalyst for unexpected judicial innovation.
After the period of the tort statute of limitations had run the
charterer impleaded the tug owner and the tug owner raised a defense of
laches, relying on the doctrine that admiralty will look to local statutes of
limitation in determining the presumptive existence of laches 8
At the trial level this defense failed, and the trial court awarded
indemnity in a decision dated April 13, 1956-more than three months
after Ryan-that found no evidence of prejudice resulting from delay,
and found that respondent, "by virtue of its relationship ...

with the im-

pleaded respondent, pleaded and proved a claim for indemnity."

9

In sup-

owner as a matter of law, reversing two jury verdicts in favor of the stevedore. The
second Supreme Court decision reinstated the second jury verdict without comment on

the court of appeals' language, which by then had been perpetuated in a number of other
cases. The shipowner's fault at issue was the failure of a deck officer to act on the
stevedore's request to start exhaust blowers in order to clear exhaust fumes from the
hold in which plaintiff was eventually overcome.
45. Section 3(a) (1) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act specifically
excludes members of a vessel's crew.
46. 245 F.2d 84, 1957 A.M.C. 1213 (2d Cir. 1957).
47. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
48. See generally GILMoRE & BLAcx, 296 n.149 & 630-37.
49. 145 F. Supp. 392, 1956 A.M.C. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). There are two earlier
opinions dealing with the laches issue: 123 F. Supp. 824, 1954 A.M.C. 1134 (S.D.N.Y.
1954), overruling the tug's motion to dismiss on the ground that the charterer's right
to indemnity accrued only when he actually was subjected to liability; and 129 F.
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port of the second point, the trial court did not cite Ryan but did cite the
court of appeals decision that Ryan affirmed on different reasoning,
Palazzolo v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp." It is not clear what point the
Palazzolo citation supports, but it is coupled with a second case51 that
deals only with the proposition that a finding of first-party liability does
not, as a matter of law, bar a right of indemnification.
The tug owner appealed. Counsel for the charterer briefed Palazzolo
because of its distinction between passive and active negligence, anticipating an argument that the judgment on the first party action was conclusive of the fact that the charterer had been at fault and was improperly
seeking contribution under the Halcyon rule. 2 The charterer did not
rely upon or even cite Ryan, nor did he cite Palazzolo with reference to
the laches defense, which was vulnerable not only to the final approach
of the trial court but also to its earlier ruling that a statute of limitations
period is measured from the time that a right vests. However, the
charterer got the benefit of Ryan anyway.
The court of appeals used Ryan to overcome the laches argument in
still another way-the tug warranted its services; that warranty was a
contract; and so the standard for presumptive laches was the six-year
New York contract statute of limitations rather than the three-year
statute governing torts.53 Far beyond the issue before it, the court's
warranty dictum thus placed a tug in the same category as the stevedore
and other employers of alias seamen who would otherwise be protected
by the Longshoremen's Act.
Thus, in a case in which there was no issue of apportioning liability
for shared fault, where the trial court had reached the same result by a
very respectable theory and could have by another, and where Ryan had
not in fact been argued by either party, Ryan nevertheless spread horizontally into the business of tugs and towing.
Dunbar v. Henry DuBois' Sons 54-- Mixed Fault, But the Tug's Was
Last. The next case in chronological order was one in which mixed fault
Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), holding the tug's laches defense not subject to an exception
(equivalent to a motion to strike under present FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)), but only as the
laches defense would apply to the direct liability of the tug owner to the barge owner
under what was then admiralty Rule 56, (equivalent to the present FED. R. Civ. P. 14
(c) )-and not to the liability of the tug owner to the barge charterer.

50. 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954).
51. Moran Towing and Transp. Corp. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A., 92
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1937).
52. See text at notes 24-30 supra. His misgiving was not unfounded, for a trial
court did rule exactly this way, only to be reversed in the court of appeals. Dunbar v.
Henry DuBois' Sons, 275 F.2d 304, 1960 A.M.C. 1393 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. 245 F.2d at 87.
54. 275 F.2d 304, 1960 A.M.C. 1393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
Counsel for the tow had been counsel for the tug in McWilliams Blue Line.
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was in much sharper focus. The owner of a capsized floating crane, exposed to liability for the wrongful death of its single crewman based upon
the barge's unseaworthiness, sought indemnity from the owner of the
towing tug. The trial court granted judgment in the first-party action
against the tow on a jury verdict, but dismissed the third-party action on
the theory that Halcyon "' precluded indemnity unless the tow's owner was
only passively negligent. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for
a new trial, citing not only Ryan and McWillians Blue Line, but also
Crumady and Weyerhaeuser-Nacirema.
Thus, in relying on the words of Ryan and the more radical cases
following it, the court of appeals ignored a substantial body of first-party
cases that had brought about a similar result in the same situation-a tug
persisting in towing a tow of obviously decreasing seaworthiness-without reliance on an attenuated theory of warranty. Instead, in first-party
cases before Dunbar,7 the courts had treated-and would in the future
continue to treat-this type of case as essentially a matter of the tug's
last clear chance to avoid the casualty 5 -- the general rule that one writer
finds as a common element in many cases allowing indemnity without
any reference to contract, actual or implied, but without getting into the
morass of active and passive negligence. 9 The distinction i's more than
simply a matter of words, for the last clear chance cases still accept
Stevens" and apparently are not limited by Halcyon."' Thus in the firstparty tort-theory cases, there would be three possibilities of liability: tug
entirely liable, tug not liable at all, and equal division of damages. But
55. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).

56. 358 U.S. 423 (1959) ; and 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
Juxtaposing Crumady and McWilliams Blue Line, it becomes clear that
appellant has set forth a cause of action against Bronx Towing by alleging thatthe unseaworthy condition of the Trenton was brought into play by the negligent
manner in which the tug Cortland performed its towing operations.

275 F.2d at 307.
57. See, e.g., Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Southern Lighterage Corp., 200 F2d 33,
1952 A.M.C. 2034 (4th Cir. 1952); Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Moran Towing and
Transp. Co., 196 F.2d 1002, 1952 A.M.C. 1118 (2d Cir. 1952); and Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 144 F. Supp. 662, 1956 A.M.C. 2186 (E.D. La.
1956), affd 244 F.2d 263, 1957 A.M.C. 1647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871
(1957) (proximate cause).
58. See, e.g., Chemical Transporter, Inc., v. M. Turecamo, Inc., 290 F.2d 496,
1961 A.M.C. 1520 (2d Cir. 1961) ; and American Bridge Div. v. Roen Steamship Co.,
216 F. Supp. 353, 1967 A.M.C. 170 (E.D. Wisc. 1963), aff'd 328 F.2d 838, 1967 A.M.C.
167 (7th Cir. 1964).
59. See Leflar, supra note 34, at 151-54. Last clear chance was discussed in the
context of a maritime indemnity case in Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaragueuse,
S.A., 364 F.2d 118, 124, 1966 A.M.C. 2392 (2d Cir. 1966); Petition of Kinsman Transit
Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719-21, 1964 A.M.C. 2503, 2518-19 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub
norn.. Continental Grain Co. v. City of Buffalo, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
60. 285 U.S. 195 (1932).

61. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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under Ryan as imported by Dunbar, Halcyon is also implicit, and the
third possibility seems foreclosed.
The Words Without the Consequences:FarrellLines v. S.S. Birken62
stein. This decision stemmed from a collision between a fully-manned
cargo ship, under tow and with a pilot, and a pier.63 There was heavy
fog, but the ship's radar was of doubtful adequacy to find the channel.6 "
The ship was not damaged, but the pier was, and its owners and some
personal injury plaintiffs sued the ship interests, who impleaded the tug
and its owners.6"
The issues were complicated by the fact that the tug interests, Moran,
had furnished the pilot but were protected by a pilotage clause.66 Thus,
like McWilliams and Dunbar, the issue was indemnity. Unlike those
cases, however, the ship was fully manned. Like Dunbar, but unlike McWilliamls, there were allegations of mixed active fault.
Judge Friendly, sitting by designation, referred to the tug's "war'
ranty of good workmanship"67
and later to Moran's "obligation of workmanlike performance."'6 If the court thus intended to mean a wholehearted importation of the McWilliams dictum, it would seem to follow
that there would be just two possible outcomes under the warranty. Either
the ship was entirely at fault or, if the tug's fault contributed to the incident and the ship's fault had not handicapped or impeded it in the performance of its warranty, the tug would be liable to indemnify the tow fully
since under Ryan-Halcyon the stevedore-warrantor is liable to indemnify
the shipowner-warrantee even if the latter is also at fault; "merely
concurrent fault is not enough" to prevent indemnity.6"
In fact, the court found the ship entirely at fault and therefore entirely denied recovery over. Yet its dictum discussing the alternative outcome was phrased in terms of contribution, not indemnity:
The parties are also in controversy whether if both sets of
interest were faulted, the share of the Moran interests would be
62. 207 F. Supp. 500, 1963 A.M.C. 1846 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
63. Id.
64. "'The average officer would realize that with this type of radar on that ship
that he is pushing it to the very limit of his [sic) capabilities in that spot, and if he is
able to use it, he is very fortunate.'" Id. at 506.
65. The court indicates in the statement of the case that libellant brought action
directly against the tug -but later says, "The Birkenstein and North German Lloyd
denied fault but also asserted that if there was any, it lay at the door of the Moran
defendants, whom they impleaded." Id. at 502. Perhaps the reference to a direct claim is
under what was then Admiralty Rule 56, now FED. R. CIv. P. 14(c).
66. A contractual disclaimer of liability as principal for the acts of a pilot has so
far received judicial approval. Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291 (1932).
67. 207 F. Supp. at 505.
68. Id. at 508.
69. See text at note 44 supra.
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seventy-five per cent (as NGL contends) thirty-three and onethird per cent (as Moran contends), or fifty per cent (for which
neither contends).70

Thus the court used McWilliams warranty words to reach Stevens
tort-collision consequences-replacing the duty without correspondingly
recasting the potential alternative outcomes. The Birkenstein is unique in
this respect among the reported cases. It is also the only reported case to
the date of writing involving a fully-manned active vessel in tow to which
the court has even by words applied a warranty standard.
Ignoring One Debate while Getting into Another-Indemnity for
Maintenance and Cure. United States v. Tug Manzanillo"' is one of a
specialized body of cases in which the shipowner is the employer of a
seaman who has recovered payments from the shipowner for maintenance and cure"2 entirely as the result of another's fault. Here a ship's
captain, boarding a tug to ride ashore, fell through an improperly secured
hatch. The captain brought and eventually settled a preliminary claim
for maintenance and cure against the shipowner, a personal injury claim
in tort against the tug owner, and a later maintenance and cure claim
against the shipowner. The shipowner claimed indemnification for both
maintenance and cure payments.
These facts place the case squarely between two conflicting bodies
of authority. A substantial body of cases beginning, by chance, with a
towing case, would deny any recovery of indemnity for maintenance and
cure-not because of any doubt the tortfeasor's duty to the shipowner,
but because of the refusal by the courts to find that breach of this duty
was the cause of the shipowner's damage, just as it would be extemely
arguable whether a shoreside employer could recover damages for increased employee-benefit premiums resulting from an injury to an employee caused by a third party.7 Once past this hurdle, however, courts
even before Ryan had found little difficulty awarding indemnity on common law grounds. 4
The court in Tug Manzanillo, however, ignored this debate over
damages entirely, but found it necessary to innovate by looking to the
70. 207 F. Supp. at 505.
71. 310 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1962).
72. Maintenance and cure is a kind of compulsory maritime health and accident
insurance providing for both medical payments and living expenses during disability
until maximum "cure" without regard to fault. See generally G~mioRE & BLACX, 253-79.
73. The leading case is The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313, 1927 A.M.C. 1471 (2d Cir.
1927) ; additional cases are collected in Gamoas & BLACK 276.
74. The leading case is Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992, 1946 A.M.C.

859 (3d Cir. 1946), but see U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). The damage
issue is discussed generally in G.moRE & BLACK 273-77.
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transposed Ryan doctrine in order to justify an award of indemnity for
both maintenance and cure payments.75
It is difficult to understand why the court should have found such
difficulty with the liability issue. Unlike the Dunbar and Birkenstein cases,
there was no issue of apportionment of fault or its effect on damages. Instead, like McWilliams Blue Line, the Tug Manzanillo seems to be one of
those cases where the court has brought a far more powerful doctrine to
bear on the issue before it than is really needed to bring about a reasonable
result. Once clear of the damage issue and stripped of its dictum, the Tug
Manzanillo simply holds that a party who sustains a loss without fault
because of the fault of another may recover indemnity for those payments. No finding of a contractual warranty with its own radical side
effects is necessary for such a result.
Two Cases in Which the Words Made a Difference. The next, and
at this writing the most recent, cases transposing Ryan to towing situations were almost exact contemporaries and were the first in which the
word formula has substantially affected the outcome. These cases, Tebbs
v. Baker-Whiteley Towing Co."8 and Singer v. Dorr7 were, like their predecessors, indemnity cases.
In Tebbs, the ship was a "dead" tanker that the United States marshal had seized in another action. Her former chief mate, Diakakis, remained on board as a lone watchman and skipper. The tug owner had
undertaken to shift the ship from one berth to another, providing not
only tugs, but also a docking master to ride on board-without the protection of a pilotage clause." It is his fault on which the Ryan issue
arose.
The watchman "singled up" a mooring line before arrival of the
tugs or pilot, leaving an old, weak springline as the only line preventing
forward movement; the pilot failed to check the sufficiency of the line;
the tugs placed a strain on it; and it parted, causing the ship to collide
with plaintiff's yacht moored ahead of it-a combination of events in
which the court found first-party liability to the owner of the damaged
yacht on the part of both tug and tow personnel," posing a question of
indemnity between tug and tow.
In deciding the first-party liability of the tug, the court had made the
passing statement that "a tug is not an insurer, is bound only to exercise
reasonable care, and is ordinarily not required to anticipate negligence on
75. 310 F.2d at 220, 221, 223.
76.
77.
78.
79.

271 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1967) (decided July 6, 1967).
272 F. Supp. 931, 1968 A.M.C. 146 (E.D. La. 1967) (decided June 16, 1967).
271 F. Supp. at 539; see note 66 supra.
Id. at 540.
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the part of those in charge of the tow.""0 It then found this principle
inapplicable even to the first-party issue because of the tug company's
additional role of providing a docking master to the ship, since the docking master gave control of both tugs and tow to the tug owner.
When, however, it came to indemnity, the principle was pure Ryan
with all of its consequences:
The claim of the Sands Point and of the government
against Baker-Whiteley is based upon the implied warranty of
workmanlike performance which Baker-Whiteley assumed when
it made its oral contract with the marshal. 8
And the fault of the watchman, though sufficient to bring about the
tow's first-party liability, did not prevent indemnity:
The fault on the part of Diakalds - taking in the second
springline before the tugs arrived - did not prevent or seriously
handicap Baker-Whiteley from doing a workmanlike job. If
Eminizer [the pilot] had made any effort to learn what lines
were out and what the condition of these lines were, he could
have taken steps to avoid the accident.82
Here, the choice of words had clearly affected the outcome. Unquestionably, under the Stevens series of cases applying the collision rule,
the court would have left first-party liability divided, just as the court
had suggested as its alternative finding in the Birkenstein.3 On the
other hand, it is arguable whether Tebbs is a towage case at all- or
whether instead it is a pilotage case, for there is no suggestion of fault
by the tug owner's employees other than the docking master, who was on
board the ship, not a tug. It has been suggested elsewhere that a pilot owes
"an implied warranty of competency,"8 4 and a connection between tug and
pilot like that in Tebbs is common in some localities but is far from universal.
The only way that Tebbs v. Baker-Whitely and Stevens v. The
to
White City can be resolved at their face values as towage cases is.
say that the tug operator owes one duty to the tow owner when the tow
itself is damaged and another when someone else is. The Tebbs decision
apparently makes this distinction, for the court discusses the tow's possible
80. Id. at 538.
81. Id. at 541.
82. Id. at 542
83. See text at note 44 supra.
84. Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaragueuse, S.A. (The El Salvador), 248 F.
Supp. 15, 37, 1966 A.M.C. 1777 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rez'd on other grounds, 364 F.2d 188,
1966 A.M.C. 2392 (2d Cir. 1966).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
warranty of its own seaworthiness to the tug with respect to the tug's
direct duty to the plaintiff"5 but ignores it in dealing with the duty to
indemnify. While it cannot be denied that under traditional non-maritime
law, treatment of the claimant's own standard of care, its breach, and
proximate cause differ somewhat depending on whether he is attempting
to recover for his own direct loss or to recover indemnity for that of
another which he has been forced to bear, there is no reason for perpetuating such an anomaly - which may itself be disappearing in its own field
- in an area of the law in which it has not previously existed. The only
possible justification for a double standard of duty is historical: Ryan
came about in a type of litigation in which third party indemnity was the
primary form of litigation because of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
*Worker's Act, while most tug-tow law has been made in situations of
direct liability. Nothing in Ryan's language or in that of any of its
progeny suggests that the stevedore's duty would be any different in a
situation giving rise to first party liability, nor does anything in the
traditional towage cases suggest a contrary result in an indemnity case.
In the second reported but first decided of this pair of cases, Singer
6
v. Dorr,"
counsel for the tug owner apparently went a step further in
characterization of Ryan as a response to a specialized and restricted problem and argued that Ryan, if limited to third party actions, was also
limited to third party actions where the third party defendant could not
be directly liable to the first party. In Singer, the tow had been an unmanned river barge-a fact reminiscent of McWilliams Blue Line. A
tug crewman fell from either the tug or the barge and drowned. His
suivivors sued both the tug owner (for negligence) and the tow interests
(for unseaworthiness), but the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of
the latter on a finding of absence of proximate cause. The tow interests,
however, cross-claimed against the tug owner, who had lost the main
case to the jury, for the costs of defense, and it was on this issue that
Ryan came into play.
Although the reported opinion stops short of holding the tug liable
for defense expenses, 7 its intent is clear: If the court were to find a
breach by the tug of the "warranty of workmanlike service" to the tow
which caused the loss, the tug owner would be liable. With respect to the
tug's argument that Ryan was no more than an expedient to escape the
Mahnich-Halcyon dilemma, the court said:
85. 271 F. Supp. at 538-39.
86. 272 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. La. 1967).
87. The trial judge had retired after ruling on the first-party case but before
ruling on the cross-claim, and the successor panel found that the first-party ruling was
not res judicata to the cross-claim, reserving the right to decide the latter independently.
272 F. Supp. at 937.
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However, we do not believe that the Ryan doctrine rests
on such a flimsy base, but rather is founded soundly on an
attempt to equitably place the burden of defending and paying
claims on the one party of the two who was in control of the
vessel and whose action resulted in the claim being brought
rather than the party technically liable.8"
What if the tug were not in control? What if the liability of the
tow owner were more than just technical? The pure Ryan formula seems
to assume answers to both questions that did not appeal to the Singer
court.
The court itself raises a third question which indicates a desire to
limit the use of Ryan to achievement of immediate justice: Could the
barge's unseaworthiness, while not causing the seaman's death, have still
caused the survivors to include in the lawsuit8 9 the tow interests ("whose
action resulted in the claim being brought," not the accident itself).
In Tebbs, the court applied the Albanese" formula of active hindrance
and found that the shipowner's negligence contributed to the accident but
to an insufficient degree and was therefore swallowed up by the warranty.
Similar reasoning in Singer v. Dorr would have simplified the lawsuit
substantially-an opportunity which the court seemed reluctant to seize.
The court could even have approached the problem from the point of
view that Singer's decedent himself contributed fifty per cent to the
accident, 9 so that his own breach of the warranty, as the tug's employee,
brought any unseaworthiness of the barge into play.
Not only is there apparent reluctance in Singer to use the full
remedial force of Ryan, but the court appears to be dominated by the
parallel between the fact that the tug was in full control of the barge
and the similar relationship that exists between stevedore and shipowner:
Both the barge owner and Ryan shipowner turn their
vessels over to the complete control of another party (tug
owner or stevedore) but nonetheless remain absolutely liable
for the condition of their vessels under the non-delegable duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel. Thus, assuming the initial seaworthiness of the vessel when control is transferred by the
owner, the owner's liability to third persons can depend entirely
88. 272 F. Supp. at 936.
89. 272 F. Supp. at 933 n.5, 936 n.8. The question is related to the following
language in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 568
(1958): ".

.

. for, as we have indicated, the duties owing from petitioner to Connolly

were not identical with those from petitioner to respondent."
90. See note 44 supra.
91. 272 F. Supp. at 934.
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on the actions of the party to whom control is transferred and
who is under the implied obligation of workmanlike service.92
In contrast, Tebbs represents a far more wholehearted reliance on
Ryan than this quoted language suggests, for there the shipowner interests
were not liable to the yacht owner because of the tow's unseaworthiness
-they owed no such duty-but because of their watchman's negligence.
The primary reason for the granting of indemnity from the tug (pilot)
to the tow was the fact that the pilot did assume the initial seaworthiness
of the vessel and was wrong; the ultimate liability resulted from inaction,
not action, by tug personnel, who only shared control over the tow.
However, setting aside Tebbs, as well as Birkenstein, where the court
had no apparent intention of granting anything beyond contribution,
the concern over control expressed in Singer touches an element common
to all the other cases transposing Ryan to towing, but not previously
discussed by a court: Courts have generally transposed and applied
Ryan where the tug owner was in sole control of the tow. While the
Singer court refused to limit Ryan to an expedient to avoid Longshoremen's Act injustices, it nevertheless hints at limitation of its
application in towing to a specialized body of situations where the physical
make-up of the tow places entire control of the operation in the tug and
the casualty is of such a nature that the tug's fault is its primary cause
and the tow owner's loss or liability is artificial and technical.
This limitation would exclude not only Tebbs from the limited
application of the transposed Ryan doctrine, but also a great many other
common towing relationships. Where Ryan would be applicable, it would
not apply to all accidents. While such a limitation overlooks the fact that
Stevens v. The White City 3 was also a sole control case, it nevertheless
recognizes the reality that towing often is distinguishable from stevedoring.
III. How

TOWING AND STEVEDORING DIFFER

If one goes beyond the words of the Stevens family of cases and
those of McWilliams Blue Line and the cases following it, it happens
that there are few easy generalizations about the ways in which tows
function. Stevedoring varies within narrow limits; towing varies within
broad.94 A tug may provide all or just some of the motive power for the
tow--or there may be instances where the tug is itself towed.9 5 The tow
92. Id. at 935.
93. 285 U.S. 195 (1932).
94.

A fairly comprehensive discussion of the variety of activities that the word

"towing" encompasses appears in BRADY, TUGS, ToWBOATS AND TOWING 1-20 (1967).
95. E.g., Petition of Marina Mercante Nicaragueuse, 364 F.2d 118, 1966 A.M.C.
2392 (2d Cir. 1966).
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may be manned or unmanned and, if manned, its crew may or may not be
responsible for control of the tow's maneuvers or just the management
of its "internal economy," the management of which may or may not be
a factor in a particular casualty."8 If an accident results from the overall
management of the tow, there may still be a dispute over whether the tug
or the tow is in the "dominant mind" in the maneuvers leading up to
the accident.
In a variety of factual settings like this, wholesale adoption of
Ryan with all of its corollary standards, defenses (if any), and remedial
consequences has as its only advantage the bringing of legal simplicity
to a complex factual situation. In both third party stevedoring cases and
all tug-tow cases, first and third party, the courts could arguably be
adopting a policy based on the premise that the claims being litigated in
reality are almost invariably either insured or brought by or against
large self-insurers; therefore occasional apparent injustices produced by
artificial, rigid rules of ultimate liability are eventually absorbed in
premium and rate adjustments and are more than offset by simplicity of
litigation and the reduction of overlapping insurance coverage. By more
or less artificially designating the stevedore's--or tug's-underwriter
as the ultimate source of payment in an accident except where the
shipowner's fault is overwhelming, the courts could, arguably, reduce
both the volume and the net cost of litigation.
If this argument is a consideration in the Ryan cases, its beneficiaries
have yet to appreciate its virtues, for they continue to litigate at an
increasing rate on the third-party level.17 Furthermore, it has not been
too many years since some tow boat operators were trying to achieve
the same sort of simplicity by the self-help expedient of disclaiming
liability for negligence in their towage contracts. The Supreme Court
quickly held this particular type of legal simplicity to be contrary to
public policy. Finally, insurance itself is not entirely artificial, for an
96. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Tug Christine Moran, 303 F.2d 197, 1961 A.M.C.
2620 (2d Cir. 1961) ; The Ellenville, 40 F.2d 47, 1930 A.M.C. 847 (4th Cir. 1930) ; and
Neptune Transp. Corp. v. Tug Bartow, 158 F. Supp. 45, 1957 A.M.C. 2046, (S.D.N.Y.
1956). "[A] tug has the right to assume that the tow will carry a competent and
sufficient crew, and is not liable for dangers, either from the unseaworthy condition of
the barge or for the failure of its owners to properly man and equip the same." Southgate v. Eastern Transp. Co., 21 F.2d 47, 49, 1927 A.M.C. 1295 (4th Cir. 1927).
The tug does not have exclusive control over the tow but only so far as is
necessary to enable the tug and those in charge of her to fulfill the engagement ....
In all other respects and for all other purposes the vessel in tow,
its cargo and crew, remain under the authority of its master; and, in emergency
the duty is upon him to determine what shall be done for the safety of his
vessel and her cargo.
Stevens v. The White City, 285 U.S. 195, 200 (1932).
97. See note 40 supra.
98. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

insured's premiums normally reflect past experience; therefore the short
term risk-spreading of insurance does not overcome the long-term
financial rewards to the insured who has a successful and effective safety
program-or who is successful in artifically passing on his liability
through indemnity actions, irrespective of the success of his safety
program. In a leading case following Ryan, the Court has stated its
concern with developing safety through placing liability with those having
the greatest degree of control over a potentially dangerous situation. 9
The Albanese formula applied in Tebbs is difficult to reconcile with this
policy even in the stevedoring situation, and the difficulty increases when
the doctrine is spread horizontally to more widely varied maritime
relationships like towing.
In general, the sweeping artificial policy of using warranty words to
select a primary insurer in accidents taking place within the context of
any marine contract without further qualifying standards is impractical,
contrary to a stated policy of law, and inconsistent with any encouragement of accident prevention by the manipulation of civil liability.
Even if the tug-tow relationship were in some instances governed
by policy considerations similar to those affecting the stevedore-shipowner
relationship, there are not only frequent factual differences in the relationships between the parties, but also substantial differences in the whole
fabric of their established legal relationships. In general, tug owner and
tow owner in a towing relationship participate more nearly as equals
than do stevedores and shipowners in the handling of cargo.
Joint participation seems to have been a major factor underlying
Stevens v. The White City's establishment of a duty of ordinary care on
the part of the tug.' No similar authority governed stevedoring, even
before Halcyon and Ryan. The more one sees a principal-client relationship between two participants in a transaction, the greater is the logic of
giving the client the benefit of a higher duty on the part of the principal
-- especially when the client is himself exposed to a technical liability
arising from a stringent duty, as is the shipowner during cargo handling
operations. While Ryan could be over-generalized bad law in a joint
control tow, it is appealing in a case where the tug is, like the stevedore,
solely in charge, especially in the case like Singer v. Dorr, where the
remedy-recovery of defense costs-is somewhat difficult to justify on
traditional tort or restitutional principles unless there is present some
contractual undertaking to free the tow owner from unjustified lawsuits
99. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315, 323 (1964). The writer emphasizes this point in a Note on this case, 62 MIcH. L.
REv. 1446 (1964). See generally Proudfoot, supra note 41.
100. See language quoted note 40 supra.
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by the tug operator's employees.
Division of damages has traditionally been an effective tool in the
apportionment of towing losses, while Halcyon foreclosed division as a
device for the redistribution and rationalization of damages in stevedoring
accidents. Although the court in Singer v. Dorr rejected the argument
that Ryan was the product of the Longshoremen's Act, to deny that it
was a product of Halcyon would be unrealistic. Perhaps the Ryan rule
does not apply to all maritime service contracts, but only those in which
contribution or division is not available, as neither was in Singer since
the tow owner had been absolved of all direct liability. Division of damages, where it is not foreclosed, is a useful tool for the trial or settlement
of lawsuits: It penalizes unsafe practices without unnecessary complexity, and it provides a favorable setting for settlement without creating a serious imbalance of equities. One could do worse in finding a way
of dealing with liability for multiple-fault accidents, and possibly the
courts in stevedoring cases have.
A striking legal difference between the tug-tow relationship and
that between stevedore and shipowner is that the tow owner normally
warrants the seaworthiness of his vessel to the tug owner,'' while it is
questionable whether the shipowner owes any similar duty to the stevedore."0 2 It is possible in a stevedore case in which the ship's unseaworthiness was a factor to apply the Albanese formula without particular confusion, if not with a high degree of justice-but where the unseaworthiness
of the tow is a contributing factor in a towing accident (in Singer the
reader will recall it was not), the relationship becomes more entangled
in the words of established law: Even if it is granted that the tug
owner warrants the tug's services, the tow owner nevertheless owes a
cross-warranty of seaworthiness. If each participant owes the other a
warranty of either vessel or service, it is difficult to utilize either warranty
-101.

"The libellant . . . in offering its vessel for tow, holds her out as '...

sufficiently staunch and strong to withstand the ordinary perils to be encountered on the
voyage."' South, Inc. v. Moran Towing & Transp. Co., 252 F. Supp. 500, 505, 1965
A.M.C. 2559 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd 360 F.2d 1002, 1966 A.M.C. 1987 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding the tow liable to the tug for loss of towing gear) ; accord, Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp. v. Tug Christine Moran, 303 F.2d 197, 1962 A.M.C. 1198 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Valentine
Waterways Corp. v. Tug Choptank, 260 F. Supp. 210, 212, (E.D. Va. 1966), aff'd 380
F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1967) ; Derby Co. v. A. L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc., 258 F. Supp.
206, 211 (E.D. La. 1966); Frederick Snare Corp. v. Moran Towing and Transp. Co.,
195 F. Supp. 639, 640, 1961 A.M.C. 2605 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (also holding the tow liable
for loss of towing gear).
102. Compare Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 392 F.2d
918 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'g 284 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1967), denying the existence of a
shipowner's duty to the stevedore, with the court's dictum in Hage v. D/S International,

170 F. Supp. 601, 610-11, 1959 A.M.C. 439(S.D. Calif. 1959), affd sub norn. Metropolitan

Stevedoring Co. v. D/S International, 274 F.2d 875, 1960 A.M.C. 591 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the
Federal Marine Terminals case. 89 S. Ct. 123 (1968).
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to make one participant in the venture primarily liable for the costs of an
accident unless some warranties carry stronger consequences than others.
Unless a court does this, or writes off the cross-warranty, as it did in
Tebbs, the logical outcome of this situation would be a division of
damages-just as it would have been under traditional Stevens tortcollision standards except for the words.
IV. CONCLUSION

And so the words of Ryan, transposed to tug-tow situations without
any apparent consideration for the relevance of the policies and history
behind their inception in stevedoring or for the factual and legal differences between stevedoring and towing, have the potential of very
radical effects if pressed to their full logical extent or very modest
effects if adapted to conform to existing law.
Placed against Stevens' attempt to define a legal relationship between
tug and tow, the Ryan words must be either restricted to indemnity cases,
an approach which fits the present cases but is illogical; treated as merely
a rephrasing of the Stevens' dictum, an approach which is uncharacteristic
of the radicalism of Ryan; or used to overrule Stevens in its entirety,
which no court citing Ryan in a towing case has indicated that it thought
it was doing. Alternatively, towage operations could be divided on their
facts between those in which the tug and tow are partners, governed by
Stevens, and those under the tug's sole control, governed by Ryan,
though possibly a Ryan doctrine modified in its consequences to reflect
the realities of tugs and towing.
Until a court critically examines what it does by generally applying
Ryan in the substantially different context of towing, such application at
best reflects fascination with words in preference to the ideas that they
are meant to convey. At its indiscriminate worst, it has a potential for
substantial unfairness.

